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Abstract 
 
 
Differences between domestic financial systems can lead to international trade. A country 
with relatively developed or decentralized financial systems will export innovative 
commodities while a country with less developed and centralized financial systems will export 
traditional commodities. Trade is always welfare improving before the resolution of 
uncertainty but the country with the more risk averse financial system and the world as a 
whole can be worse off with trade after the resolution of uncertainty. A temporary protection 
can be welfare improving for such risk averse countries which are often the less developed 
ones. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
King and Levine (1993) confirm the Schumpeterian idea that financial institutions are 
important because they finance entrepreneurs for their introduction of innovative activities. 
Therefore, “Financial sector taxes are equivalent to taxes on innovative activities, since they 
reduce the net returns that financial intermediaries gain from financing successful 
entrepreneurs, it thereby impedes innovative activity”1. That is, the financial development, as 
revealed by the level of credit and the size of the capital market, encourages innovative 
activities.  
Another important feature is that stock markets enable individuals to diversify away 
idiosyncratic risk of individual projects. As quoted by Saint-Paul (1992) “capital markets 
make possible the spreading of risk through financial diversification (…). Financial markets 
allow riskier technologies”. Therefore, without banks or with imperfects financial markets, 
choices of individuals are affected by their degree of risk aversion. 
Developing countries are mainly concerned by these problems. Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990) model explains how income levels can affect the structure of the financial system. 
Financial intermediaries appear only with the increasing of national income. Consequently, 
poor countries can be trapped in producing traditional commodities while richer countries can 
produce innovative commodities.  
But the structure of the financial system is also important for developed countries as well 
since different types of financial systems provide different incentives for investment and 
firms’ governance. For instance, the UK and US market oriented systems, with dispersed 
shareholdings, is often opposed to the Continental European and Japanese system where 
banks and large dominant shareholders play a dominant role. Then “Continental European and 
Japanese systems are thought to be characterized by long-tem relations which encourage long-
term, primarily bank, finance. On the other hand, the UK and the US are regarded as 
benefiting from high levels of equity risk capital.”2 
A theoretical argument is developed by Qian and Xu (1995). The authors oppose the soft 
budgeting constraints of centralized financial systems and the hard budgeting constraints of 
decentralized finance. Their model is relevant to understand the impact of various financial 
institutions. They show that R&D in small firms financed by venture capitalists enjoys an 
                                                 
1 King R., Levine R. (1993). 
2 Mayer C. (1998). 
advantage in highly uncertain innovative projects, while R&D in large corporations has an 
advantage in less uncertain projects: centralized, large firms are more prudent. 
So, the level of financial development as well as the structure of the financial system matter 
regarding the incentives to innovate. More precisely, developed finance systems, small firms, 
and market oriented finance encourages ceteris paribus risk taking and then innovative 
activities which are riskier and more uncertain than traditional one (Schumpeter (1942)).  
Hence it is assumed in our model that each country has its proper attitude towards risk 
depending on the level of development and the characteristics of its financial system3.  
 
In this paper, we introduce international trade between such different countries and we focus 
on the resulting welfare consequences. The theory of the second best developed by Lancaster 
and Lipsey (1956) and Bhagwati (1971) is helpful to understand the normative consequence 
of free trade. Actually, the theory of the second best predicts that countries can be worse with 
trade when autarky equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. Grossman and Helpman (1991) have 
already studied the link between innovation and trade. They showed that some countries will 
export traditional commodities while others will export innovative commodities. Moreover 
they suggest that the opening to trade is not always welfare increasing. In their model, the 
distortion comes from dynamic increasing returns.  
In this paper, autarky equilibrium is not Pareto optimal because imperfect financial markets 
imply a suboptimal production of innovative commodities. This distortion is increasing with 
the level of risk aversion in the country. Contrary to Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) and Shy 
(1988), we assume that risk is idiosyncratic to each manager rather than global. This 
assumption allows us to focus on entrepreneurial and personal dimension of innovative 
activities. Moreover, it also permits to analyse, in static comparative model, the welfare 
consequences of international trade from an ex ante and an ex post perspectives. 
 
Section 2 defines the microeconomic foundations of innovative choice, section 3 recalls some 
salient stylised facts about finance and innovation. Section 4 develops the model and its 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 Of course, other institutional characteristics certainly matter such as administrative barriers or legal 
consequences of failure which can deter managers to undertake risky businesses. 
2 MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INNOVATIVE CHOICE 
The link between macroeconomic financial systems and the individual managerial 
microeconomic decision to invest in innovative activities can be captured by the concept of 
entrepreneur. 
According to Schumpeter (1911), the entrepreneur breaks the stationary state by introducing 
innovations into the economic system. But, motivation of entrepreneurs is not pecuniary but 
glory. Entrepreneur is a kind of romantic and irrational hero. So, microeconomic foundations 
of his behavior are irrelevant. For Frank Knight (1921), entrepreneur is rational. Uncertainty 
bearing is the true function of his entrepreneur. Then a manager becomes an entrepreneur if 
he chooses an uncertain activity rather than a routine one. To make up his mind, a manager 
has to anticipate the price of the final product which depends on the decision of other 
managers and on the demand conditions. Then for Knight, the level of entrepreneurship is 
resulting from a rational decision making process in a context of true uncertainty.  
In this paper we build the decision to innovate on microeconomic foundations in a context of 
risk rather than true uncertainty (in the Knight’s sense). We consider that a manager has to 
choose between a risky activity and a routine one. He compares the expected gains of each 
alternative following the Von Neumann-Morgenstern decision theory. By definition, 
managers become entrepreneurs when they choose the innovative activity. 
It seems reasonable to assume that entrepreneurs have lower risk aversion than non 
entrepreneurs. The question is to examine if empirical studies support this statement. Consider 
that entrepreneurs invest only a part of their wealth in their business which is very risky 
compared to other equities. Then if entrepreneurs were as risk averse as others, they should 
invest the remainder of their wealth in less risky assets. For Gentry and Hubbard (2001), this 
is not the case so entrepreneurs seem to have lower risk aversion. 
Another salient characteristic of entrepreneurs is documented by Moskovitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002) who point out that entrepreneurial investment is very concentrated. In fact, 
they find that “about 75% of all private equity is owned by household for whom it constitutes 
at least 50% of their net total worth”. This lack of diversification is very puzzling because the 
return of entrepreneurship tends to be low when controlling for risk. Lower risk-aversion, 
overoptimism, non-pecuniary benefits partly explain why entrepreneurs accept a low return 
compared to risk. 
In this paper, we connect the microeconomic entrepreneurial foundations of an innovative 
choice and the macroeconomic domestic financial system by the manager’s risk aversion. We 
capture institutional differences by assuming a country’s specific measure of constant risk 
relative aversion of its managers. Within one given country, all managers have the same 
measure of risk aversion depending on the domestic financial system of the country in which 
they operate. Between countries, risk aversion measures can be different: the more the 
domestic financial system is risk friendly, the more the countries’ managers have, ceteris 
paribus, a small measure of their constant risk relative aversion. 
Managers of one country are assumed to be more risk averse than the managers of the other 
country. This is consistent with empirical study of Nakagawa and Shimizo (1999) which 
shows that Japan’s households are two or three times as risk averse as those in the United 
States: that is an average relative risk aversion around 2 in USA and 6 in Japan since 60’s 
years to 90’s. 
3 STYLIZED FACTS 
Domestic financial systems have different characteristics between countries. For instance, in 
Japan, banks play a crucial role since they are closely linked with firms. The firms which are 
members of a keiretsu are both financed and monitored by their main bank4. The American 
firms prefer the financial markets when they seek external financing.5 So, stock markets are 
well developed, and pension funds are important actors. The monitoring is less efficient in 
such a market oriented financial system, but the budgeting constraint is surely stronger than in 
a bank oriented system. 
So, following the arguments of Qian and Xu (1995), risky innovations will be more promoted 
is the decentralized system. Start-up firms and innovative projects will be numerous and 
market will only select and refinance the more efficient ones. In the bank centralized system, 
the weaker budgeting constraint prevents to stop bad firms or bad projects. So, in order to 
avoid this difficulty to stop inefficient projects, the famous “Concord Effect”, firms are more 
prudent in the screening and financing of innovative projects. 
So, following those theoretical predictions, the stylized facts should confirm those 
predictions. Prior to this verification, some data and indicators are needed. 
 
                                                 
4 Aoki and Patrick (1994) 
5 See Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
 
The data 
 
Financial system Index 
 
In order to compare nations, it is useful to build a quantitative measure of the financial 
systems. 
Block (2002), have build, by using principle components analysis, a composite index 
incorporating several financial structure variables: bank concentration, an index of accounting 
standards, ownership concentration, the ratio of assets of deposit money bank over GDP, the 
stock market capitalization, the availability of company information.  
This composite index reveals the diversity in the size and the character of national financial 
systems. The financial systems which are well developed and market oriented are called by 
Block (2002) the outsider systems (high value of the index). The poorly developed financial 
systems and bank oriented ones are called the insider systems. Outsider systems, (small value 
of the index) are characterized by lower bank and ownership concentration as well as better 
accounting standards and greater stock market orientation relative to insider systems. Figure 1 
shows the values of the Outsider/Insider index for the 17 OECD countries. 
Figure 1. Insider and outsider system 
 
Source : Block (2002), page 32. 
 
We verify that, US and UK, countries who have a market oriented financial market are ranked 
on the top. The case of Japan is less intuitive but the share of financial markets in the global 
source of funds of firms has grown rapidly during the 90’s. 
According to Mayer (1998), countries characterized by the continental system of finance, that 
is, Germany, Italy, are revealed to be endowed with insider systems. France seems to be in an 
intermediate situation. 
If our intuition is correct, countries endowed with relative risk friendly institutions (outsider 
systems) must have an higher proportion of innovations than countries endowed with relative 
risk averse institutions (insider systems).  
 
For illustration, we must find an index of innovative activities.  
 
Innovation Index 
 
The Summary Innovation Index (SII) proposed by the European Commission, in the European 
Innovation Scoreboard (See Bugnot (2004)), is useful for our purpose. 
Table 1. Innovation and uncertainty avoidance: an international comparison 
 Summary innovation index (SII) 
The Inside/Outsider 
indicator 
Austria 0.39 -1.20 
Belgium  0.47 -0.60 
Denmark 0.54 -0.45 
Finland 0.75 -0.10 
France  0.46 0 
Germany 0.56 -0.25 
Greece  0.20 -0.95 
Italy 0.31 -0.50 
Japan 0.77 0.75 
Norway  0.40 -0.40 
Portugal 0.30 -1.60 
Spain 0.30 -0.40 
Sweden  0.76 0.40 
The Netherlands 0.45 0.05 
United Kingdom  0.49 2.25 
United States 0.70 1.70 
Source: The Summary Innovation Index is provided by the European Innovation Scoreboard (2004), page 9. The 
Insider/Outsider indicator comes from Block (2002), page 32. 
 
Japan, Finland, Sweden and US are clearly on the top of innovative countries and (Except 
Finland) have outsider systems. Another group of countries, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Norway, The Netherlands, UK, can be ranked as intermediate countries regarding 
innovative activities. They are also intermediate regarding their financial systems (except 
UK). Other countries, endowed with very insider systems, are poor innovators. 
 
But, the link between financial system and innovation is indirect. First, Financial system 
biases the attitudes of managers and firms towards risk and uncertainty. Second, the different 
attitudes towards uncertainty lead to different level of innovation inside countries. 
Consequently, we need an index of the different attitude towards uncertainty in countries. 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
A way to estimate the attitude towards uncertainty of countries can be found in the empirical 
study of Hofstede (2001) regarding the cultural differences between countries. Hofstede 
defines the cultural attitude towards uncertainty with the Uncertainty Avoidance Index. 
Countries are ranked regarding their UAI: a high value of the index corresponds to high 
uncertainty avoidance.  
UAI can be influenced by the structure and level of the financial system. But UAI can also be 
influenced by psychological, cultural or institutional characteristics. We use UAI as an index 
of reluctance to undertake innovative activities. 
 
Table 2. Innovation and uncertainty avoidance: an international comparison 
 Summary innovation index (SII) uncertainty avoidance 
Austria 0,39 70 
Belgium  0,47 94 
Denmark 0,54 23 
Finland 0,75 59 
France  0,46 86 
Germany 0,56 65 
Greece  0,20 112 
Ireland 0,44 35 
Italy 0,31 75 
Japan 0,77 92 
Norway  0,40 50 
Spain 0,30 86 
Sweden  0,76 29 
Switzerland  0,68 58 
The Netherlands 0,45 53 
Turkey 0,05 85 
United Kingdom  0,49 35 
United States 0,70 46 
Source: The Summary Innovation Index is provided by the European Innovation Scoreboard (2004), page 9. The 
uncertainty avoidance index comes from Hofstede (2001), page 151. 
If our intuition is correct, the more the countries avoid uncertainty, the less they should 
innovate. SSI and UAI are presented in the following table 2. The well known outsider 
countries UK, US, Sweden, have a low Uncertainty Aversion Index while Spain, Italy, 
Austria have a strong UAI. France and Japan are more averse than their financial system can 
suggest but, cultural and historical features can also influence their aversion. 
 
Are the intuitions correct? 
 
Ordinary Least Squares regressions show that, first, the uncertainty avoidance index is 
decreasing with the financial system index and, second, the summary innovation index is 
decreasing with the uncertainty avoidance index. 
Table 2. Relationship between financial system, uncertainty avoidance and innovation 
 Uncertainty Avoidance innovation 
Financial system 
-14.3** 
(5,7) 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index 
 
-0.004** 
(0.0017) 
Number of 
observations 
17 19 
R-square 0.30 0.23 
Dependent variables are reported in columns. 
Standard errors are reported below the coefficient estimates. Intercept are not reported for ease of presentation.  
** define 5 per cent significance level. 
 
Even though regressions are significant at 5% significant level, we must be cautious with 
these results since the sample of countries is limited. Nevertheless, our intuition that financial 
systems features influence attitudes towards risk and consequently biases the innovative 
behaviour inside countries seems correct.  
 
International specialization under free trade 
 
From international trade point of view, the question is to examine the revealed comparative 
advantages regarding patterns of financial systems. Countries with outsider financial systems 
should exhibit a revealed comparative advantage in the innovative commodities. Block (2002) 
obtains some interesting results, when innovative commodities exportations are measured by 
outputs of technological sectors. In his econometric study, bank and ownership concentration 
are associated negatively with export performance in sectors with high science inputs. 
These stylised facts seem to corroborate the possibility of an influence of financial systems on 
the trade patterns.   
4 THE MODEL 
Our theoretical analysis confirms the previous stylised facts. In the model, the differences 
between financial systems are captured by differences between the managers’ coefficient of 
risk aversion between countries. Moreover, the model permits to examine the welfare 
consequences of international trade grounded on such institutional determinants. 
4.1 The framework 
Let us assume two countries M, the More risk averse and L, the Less risk averse. So M has a 
risk averse, poorly developed, insider financial system while L has a risk friendly, well 
developed, market oriented, an outsider financial system. 
As in Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), each country has a continuum of risk averse managers 
indexed on the interval [0,1]. Managers have to choose exclusively between two production 
projects C and R. Project C is certain and provides one unit of (traditional) commodity C. 
Project R is risky and provides one unit of (innovative) commodity R with probability θ, and 
k<1 unit of R with probability 1-θ. So expected production of R is: k)1( θθµ −+= . 
The risk is idiosyncratic to each manager’s project rather than global. Though risk is 
idiosyncratic, aggregate uncertainty is cancelled by the application of the law of large 
numbers6.  
Within one given country, managers have the same Constant Relative Risk Aversion measure 
affecting their indirect ex ante utility function. But, the risk aversion levels of managers differ 
between countries. Let LM αα ;  be the CRRA of managers in M and L we assume that: LM αα > . 
Commodity C is the numéraire so p  refers to the relative price of commodity R in terms of 
C. Aggregate demand functions for the two commodities have unitary price and income 
                                                 
6 As quoted by Judd (1985), there are some difficulties with the application of the law of large numbers in a 
continuum. However, we follow here the tradition of economic literature, as the seminal works of Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) or Lucas and Prescott (1974), which explicitly or implicitly avoid this difficulty.  
elasticity and b denotes the share of income devoted to the consumption of commodity R; so, 
jCj y)b1(d −=  and p
by
d jRj =  where jy  is the aggregate income of country J. 
Welfare analysis is based on two criteria, an ex ante criterion (before the resolution of 
uncertainty) and an ex post criterion (after the resolution of uncertainty). This distinction is 
useful to explain why a country can regret ex post a free trade commitment based on the ex 
ante welfare analysis.  
Before the resolution of uncertainty, the aggregate welfare comes from the indirect ex ante 
utility function which depends on the risk aversion measure of managers and on the expected 
income y~  and p. 
The indirect ex ante utility function ),~( pyVV = is quite the same as in Newbery and Stiglitz 
(1984) and Shy (1988): 
(1)                                  α
α
−
−= −−−1
]~)1([ 11 bbb pybb
V , for 1≠α  
)ln()~ln()1)ln(1(ln pbybbbbbV −+−−+= , for 1=α  
Moreover, an ex post welfare analysis can be evaluate with idiosyncratic risk. After the 
resolution of uncertainty, the aggregate welfare depends on jy  the effective income of 
country J. Then ex post welfare of country J is: 
(2)                                     bjbbj pybbU −−−= 1)1( .  
4.2. The autarky equilibrium 
General equilibrium is reached when the risky commodity market clears. At the equilibrium 
price, the amount of risky commodity demanded by all agents equals the amount supplied (ex 
post) by managers who have chosen (ex ante) the risky process. 
Since commodity C is the numéraire, the expected income of entrepreneurs is µp  whereas 
the income of managers is, of course, certain and equal to 1. Let n  be the number of 
managers who choose the risky project and let call them the entrepreneurs. The number of 
managers who choose the certain project is n−1 .  
Aggregate income is then: nnpy −+= 1µ   
As risk is idiosyncratic, the law of large numbers holds and so global ex post supply is certain 
and equal to n×µ . The global demand is p
yb . Then equalization of global supply and global 
demand of the risky commodity gives the market clearing price p: 
 (3)                                              [ ]nnppbn −+= 1µµ ⇔ nnbbp µ−×−= 11  
 
Managers choose between R versus C by maximizing their indirect ex ante utility function. 
Hence, for a given p , they maximize their expected income following Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (VNM) expected utility theory. The certain projects delivers always 1=CV  but 
the VNM expected income of the uncertain project is αα θθ −− −+= 11 ))(1( kppVU  . 
 
Decision rule 
 
•A given manager chooses the project C if and only if UC VV > ;  
•A given manager chooses the project U if and only if CU VV > ; 
•A given manager is indifferent between both projects if CU VV = . 
 
But, as managers are all identical inside a country, it implies that the equilibrium (ex post) 
market clearing price is reached when identical managers are indifferent between both 
projects, that is: 
(4)                      1))(1( 11 =−+ −− αα θθ kpp  ⇔ [ ] 111)1( −−−+= ααθθ kp  
 
Since managers are risk averse, p  is always superior to µ1  which holds for 0=α . Moreover, 
(4) ensures that p  is an increasing function of α .  
The equilibrium level of entrepreneurship an  is given by (3) and (4): 
(5)                                          [ ] bbk bna +−−+= −− )1()1( 111 µθθ αα   
From (5) we can verify that the level of entrepreneurship in autarky is a decreasing function 
of the measure of risk aversion. Recall that, in this paper, the coefficient of risk aversion is 
postulated to be a decreasing function of the level of development of financial markets. It 
follows that entrepreneurship, that is innovative activities are an increasing function of the 
financial development. This is consistent with King and Levine (1993) and Saint-Paul (1992) 
results and with the previously mentioned stylised facts. 
4.3. The free trade equilibrium 
We verify from (5) that n  is a decreasing function of the risk aversion measure α . So it 
follows that M, the more risk averse country has a lower n in autarky than L. From (4), it 
follows that the autarky price in M is higher than the autarky price in L. So, the law of 
comparative advantages lead to international trade. Hence, the opening of trade will lead 
country L to export the risky commodity R, while the country M will export the certain 
commodity C. Let denote ∗p  the free trade price, with complete specialization we have: 
(6)                                                      µ)1( bbp −=∗  
Global ex post supply of R in free trade with complete specialization is µ=rs  while global 
demand is ∗
∗
∗
+=+= p
pb
p
yybd MLR
)1()( µ .With rr ds = , we obtain equation (6). 
Moreover, specializations can be either complete or incomplete depending on the value of b, 
Lp  and Mp . From (6), ∗
∗
∗ +=⇔−= p
p
bb
bp µ
µ
µ 1)1( , we deduct the three following cases: 
• Specialization of country L is incomplete when (7)        Lpp =∗ ⇔
L
L
p
pb µ
µ
+≤1  
• Specialization of country M is incomplete when (8)        Mpp =∗ ⇔
M
M
p
pb µ
µ
+≥1  
• Specializations are complete when: (9)         ML ppp << ∗ ⇔
M
M
L
L
p
pb
p
p
µ
µ
µ
µ
+<<+ 11  
Notice that in (9), p
pbpp µ
µ
+>⇔> 1* . As p is always superior to µ1  then it implies 21>b  
 
So, the differences between financial systems of countries can lead to different attitudes 
towards risk and consequently innovations and entrepreneurship. International trade leads to 
specializations. The more risk averse country, endowed with a weak financial system (or bank 
oriented one) will export the traditional and certain commodity whereas the less risk averse 
country, endowed with a well developed financial system (or market oriented one), will 
export the risky commodity.  
4.4. The effect of free trade on ex ante welfare 
The consequence of such a trade, grounded on differences between financial systems is now 
examined relatively to its welfare consequences. 
From an ex ante perspective, before the resolution of uncertainty, we compare aggregate 
indirect ex ante utility function under autarky and free trade. 
 
Proposition 1:  Both countries are indifferent or better off under free trade from an ex ante 
welfare analysis. 
 
Proof: 
In autarky, the managers of the country M are indifferent between projects. So, their expected 
income is 1. Then, if specialization is complete, M is always better off ex ante with trade: its 
global income is still 1, because all managers of M produce the certain commodity and 
consumers of the country M have a positive price effect since the risky commodity becomes 
cheaper. 
For L, gain from trade can be easily shown: 
[ ][ ] )1(
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When specialization is incomplete for a country, this country is indifferent between autarky 
and trade because nor its income neither its price change with the opening of trade. The other 
country is always better off , the proof is identical to that of the complete specialization case.  
Before the resolution of uncertainty, trade is expected to improve welfare because the 
differences in the risk aversion act as if technologies were not identical between countries. 
Hence, ex ante welfare increases thanks to traditional gains from specialization and managers 
would clearly lobby in favour of a free trade commitment. 
4.5. The effect of free trade on ex post welfare 
Risk aversion induces a distortion in the allocation of managers between sectors in autarky. 
Without risk aversion, or with perfect insurance markets, the allocation between sectors 
comes from the tastes of consumers: the share b of managers devoted to the production of 
risky commodity. This first-best Pareto optimum is achieved when managers are risk neutral. 
Hence, risk aversion leads to a share of managers devoted to the risky sector different from b. 
With imperfects financial markets, choices of individuals are affected by their risk aversion 
(Saint-Paul (1992)). So, imperfection of markets for risk hedging leads to a sub-optimal 
allocation of managers in autarky. Then, in the spirit of the theory of second-best of Lipsey 
and Lancaster (1956), the salient question is to examine if free trade can correct this autarky 
distortion or not,  the  
After the resolution of uncertainty, i.e. with ex post welfare analysis, the effective levels of 
consumption and welfare are revealed and the attitude towards risk doesn’t matter anymore. 
b
j
bb
j pybbU −−−= 1)1(  
 
Proposition 2:  From an ex post welfare analysis, the less risk averse country is always better 
off with trade. Proof: See appendix A 
 
Proposition 3:  From an ex post welfare analysis, the more risk averse country can be worse 
off with trade. Proof: See appendix B 
 
Proposition 4: From an ex post welfare analysis, the world as a whole can be worse off with 
trade. Consequently, lump-sums transfers are not always possible. 
Proof: See appendix C. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Differences between domestic financial systems can lead to international trade as those 
differences biases the attitude towards risk of domestic managers. Countries with relatively 
developed or decentralized financial systems will export innovative commodities while 
countries with less developed and centralized financial systems will export traditional 
commodities. The opening of trade can ceteris paribus, amplify the concentration of 
innovative activities in some countries.  
 
As this trade is grounded on countries’ specific attitude towards risk, ex ante analysis and ex 
post welfare analysis of the opening of trade can lead to opposite assessment. If free trade is 
always preferred from an ex ante welfare analysis, free trade can lower the ex post welfare of 
the more risk averse country and the world as a whole. Autarky distortions can be amplified 
by trade. Then, free trade commitment which are decided from an ex ante welfare analysis can 
be regretted ex post. 
It could be preferable for the more averse country, i.e. the country with the less developed or 
the more centralized financial system to protect itself from trade. In fact, the less developed 
countries which have obviously a less developed financial system can be in such a case. 
Nevertheless, protectionism is not the first-best solution and a better policy is to deal with 
institutional or financial factors. A better way is to develop financial markets, access to credit, 
to avoid financial repression, before the opening of trade. Remark that our model leads to 
conclusions which remain close in spirit to the arguments mobilized in favour of temporary 
protection for infant industries.  
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Appendix A: Ex post gains for country L 
 
 
• if specialization is complete then L is always better off with trade: 
From (4) and (5), autarky income is:   (10)           
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Moreover, from (6), we have the free trade income of L: (11)     b
byL −=∗ 1  
Ex post welfare of free trade relative to autarky is (12)       b
b
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(10),(11),(12) gives the ex post welfare of L:(13)       ( )bbppb
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As 1)1( >+− bbpµ  as 1>pµ and that from (9) ⇔>∗ Lpp ⇒+> L
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µ  then (13) is superior 
to 1 (Q.E.D). 
• if specialization is incomplete for L, L is better off: 
Then L has no price effect; pp =∗ . Moreover its income effect is always positive: 
npnyL µ+−=∗ 1  so with pbp
ybn L += ∗µ  supply/demand equilibrium gives b)b1(p b2n +−µ=  then 
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µ  since 1p>µ   Q.E.D. 
• if specialization is incomplete for M, L is better off: 
Then there is a negative price effect for L while its income effect is positive:  
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 with bb pp >∗  and 1p>µ  Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix B: Ex post gains for country M are indeterminate 
 
• When specializations are complete. 
Ex post welfare for M is from (12): 
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As 5.0>b  and as 1][ 1 >−bpµ , the denominator is superior to 1. On the contrary, nothing 
guarantees that the numerator is superior to 1 and a fortiori superior to the denominator. 
Hence, we can’t conclude without numerical simulations. The following numerical example 
shows that the more averse country can be worse off with trade. 
Let ,8.0,3.0k,5.0,7.0 =θ==β=α so 86.0=µ  
We verify that L is always better off with trade while the benefit of trade for M depends from 
the value of b . If b is less than 0.55, M is worse off with trade, while if b is greater than or 
equal to 0.55 then M is better off with trade. 
Let ,8.0,3.0k,5.1,2 =θ==β=α so 86.0=µ . If b is less than 0.65, M is worse off with trade, 
while if b is greater than or equal to 0.65 then M is better off with trade. 
Let ,8.0,3.0k,2,20 =θ==β=α so 86.0=µ . If b is less than 0.525, M is better off with trade, 
while if b is greater than or equal to 0.525 then M is worse off with trade. 
But M can be always worse off when: ,8.0,1.0k,5.1,2 =θ==β=α or always better off when: 
8.0,8.0k,5.1,2 =θ==β=α  
 
 
Appendix C: The world as a whole can be worse off with trade. 
 
Let JR  the hicksian compensated income such that country J achieves the same level of utility 
given the price change from ap  to *p : )y,p(U)Ry,p(U aJaJ*Jj*J**j =+ . Then, we have 
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Numerical illustration 
For example, when 7.0b= , ,8.0,3.0k,2,20 =θ==β=α so 86.0=µ , the world welfare decreases. 
In this case, specializations are complete and we have 62.0R M =  53.0R L −=  so 
009.0R
J
J >=∑ . 
 
